

## Welcome

Godfried De Vidts Chairman of the European Repo Council Brussels, 8 April 2013




## ERC work – a sample

- 25 May 2012
   ICMA European Repo Council (ERC) Repo Margining Best Practices 2012\*
- 20 August 2003
   Repo Trading Practice Guidelines of 20 August 2003
- 12 July 2012 <u>Floating-rate repo conventions</u>
- 25 July 2011 <u>ERC recommendation on Repo matching as a driver for risk reduction (25 July 2011)</u>
- 9 November 2007
   <u>Resolution by the ERC Committee on the Harmonisation of GMRA mini close-out provisions and ICMA buy-in rules (9 November 2007)</u>
- 16 November 2004
   <u>Recommendation regarding fails in negative interest rate repos, approved by the International Repo Council on 16 November 2004</u>
- 19 April 2004
   Confirmation of second leg of buy/sell back transactions (Letter from the ERC committee chairman to firms active in the repo market, dated 19 April 2004)




#### **Headline numbers**






## **Currency analysis**






## **Collateral analysis**





#### **Maturity analysis**





### Presentation

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Brussels, 8 April 2013



- much analysis has started from the wrong point
- this is the non-fiscal objective of the FTT --- to curtail financial intermediation
- direct issuer-investor interaction in primary market
- limited secondary market, passive investment strategies, agency brokers
- could inspiration be the equity market --- order-driven, commission-paying, exchange-traded?
- terms of the debate are focused on the utility of secondary markets




- would the DG Tax model work in fixed income?
- very different market:
  - high-volume risk-free government issues, typically plain vanilla --- challenge is rapid distribution
  - lower volume credit issues, typically complex structures
     --- challenge is pricing & smooth distribution
- key role for primary dealers & market-makers



- consequences for the repo market
- incidence of flat rate of 0.10% on short-term transactions




#### FTT & repo revenue



#### revenue from typical repo EUR per million


	bid/offer spread			
repo term	0.05%	0.10%	0.15%	
1D	1.39	2.78	4.17	
1W	9.72	19.44	29.17	
1M	43.06	86.11	129.17	
3M	126.39	252.78	379.17	
6M	252.78	505.56	758.33	
12M	506.94	1,013.89	1,520.83	












# implied break-even spreads %pa

	normal bid/offer spread		
repo term	0.05%	0.10%	0.15%
1D	72.05%	72.10%	72.15%
1W	10.34%	10.39%	10.44%
1M	2.37%	2.42%	2.47%
3M	0.84%	0.89%	0.94%
6M	0.45%	0.50%	0.55%
12M	0.25%	0.30%	0.35%





The European repo market will contract by at least 66%.



- repo is pivotal to:
  - secondary market-making
  - primary dealing
  - short-term institutional investment
  - bank funding
  - monetary policy implementation
  - financial stability (eg CCP, liquidity buffers)



- loss of repo & money market securities --- secondary market
  - DG Tax says securities volume down 15% --- optimistic
  - loss of repo plus direct impact of FTT
  - flight of foreign investors
  - how to distribute high-volume government debt?
  - how to distribute low-volume corporate debt?
  - portfolio valuation become more difficult
  - delivery failures increase



- loss of repo & money market securities --- primary market
  - DG Tax says securities volume down 15% --- optimistic
  - DG Tax says buy primary issues, follow long-term investment strategies
  - pricing become more difficult
  - issuer & investor overheads & risk rise



- loss of repo & money market securities --- investors
- DG Tax says central bank repo & secured loan --- not feasible
- EU11 investors' choice:
  - overnight unsecured deposits
  - capital flight outside the EU11



- loss of repo & money market securities --- banks
  - banks lose wholesale funding
  - banks lose bond debt funding
  - accelerated, perhaps disorderly deleveraging
  - shortage of working capital in real economy



- loss of repo & money market securities --- central banks
  - no collateral framework for monetary policy implementation
  - no market mechanism to monitor & signal
  - further fragmentation of eurozone
  - EU11 collateral at ECB becomes illiquid



- loss of repo & money market securities --- financial stability
  - movement of collateral too expensive, only cash collateral
  - no collateral market
  - de-collateralisation reverses impact of Basel
  - liquidity buffers more expensive & difficult to build
  - operational risk increased



- loss of repo & money market securities --- real economy
  - capital flight
  - shortage of working capital
  - investment capital more expensive
  - long-term growth potential
  - competitive disadvantage
  - relocation of financial services



- some final remarks
  - relationship with the non-EU11
  - cost of transition
  - tax as a regulatory tool
  - how (not) to redesign the financial system